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Cash transfer programmes are widely considered a ‘magic bullet’ for reducing 
poverty. Whether they actually have such an incredible impact on poverty reduction is 
debatable but they surely are gaining credibility as an effective safety net mechanism and 
consequently an integral part of inclusive growth strategies in many developing countries. 
As shown by Ali (2007), inclusive growth rests on three basic premises.  First, productive 
employment opportunities should be created to absorb labour force. Second, capability 
enhancement and skill development should be focused in order to broaden people’s access 
to economic opportunities. And lastly, a basic level of well-being has to be guaranteed by 
providing social protection. Safety nets are at the core of the last pillar, provided mainly 
through cash transfers, which can be both conditional and unconditional.  
The basic rationale behind the social safety nets is to assist the poor to better 
manage risk and   help them to adopt a strategy that protects their assets. The importance 
of these safety nets has been recognised not only for their social and economic value but 
also as a means to improve political stability and control crime and riots. These safety 
nets help people through short-term stress and insecurities, which if properly managed 
can lead to long-term poverty alleviation as well. Direct transfers by the government are a 
common means of providing safety net to the poor. Such transfers include direct 
provision of food or cash (conditional or unconditional) to the target population. Other 
means of providing safety nets include: education and health subsidies; energy, water and 
housing subsidies; and public works programmes. It is worth mentioning here that, 
although usually used interchangeably, there is a need to differentiate between the term 
social protection and social safety nets [Bari, et al. (2005); Sayeed (2004)]. Conceptually, 
analytically and by implications, social protection is a right that every citizen must have 
while safety nets are instruments employed to   provide these rights.1  
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1
For a detailed discussion on defining social protection in the Pakistani context, and the difference 
between social protection and social safety nets see Sayeed (2004) and Bari, Hooper, Kardar, Khan, 
Mohammad and Sayeed (2005). 
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Pakistan is going through a rather prolonged phase of stagflation making the 
provision of social safety nets all the more important. Even during the periods of high 
economic growth the ‘trickle-down effect’ did not essentially take place, necessitating the 
need to introduce safety nets in the overall poverty alleviating strategies. A variety of 
safety net programmes exist in the country but to mitigate the situation resulting from the 
low economic growth and high inflation, especially food inflation, the government of 
Pakistan launched the Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP) in 2008. The enrolled 
households under BISP are paid an amount of rupees one thousand per month, without 
any conditions  attached to them. The findings of this study, as would be seen latter, show 
that this cash transfer does provide relief to the recipient households but the program does 
have issues of targeting and exclusion.  
The present paper aims to evaluate the effectiveness of the BISP in sustaining a 
recipient household’s welfare in the face of prevailing tough economic conditions. In the 
sections to follow the paper would look into the: safety net programmes functioning in 
the country and the background to the BISP; data source and methodology employed; the 
evaluation of the BISP as an effective safety net initiative; and conclusions drawn from 
the discussion and policy recommendations.  
 
BISP AND OTHER SAFETY NET PROGRAMMES 
IN PAKISTAN 
Pakistan is one of the very few developing countries that guarantees social security 
of its citizens in the Constitution. Article 38, ‘Promotion of social and economic well-
being of the people’, in its clause c and d states, “The state shall: provide  for all  persons 
employed  in the  service  of Pakistan  or otherwise, social security by compulsory social 
insurance or other means; and provide basic necessities of life, such as food, clothing, 
housing, education and  medical relief,  for all  such citizens,  irrespective of sex, caste, 
creed or race, as  are permanently  or temporarily  unable  to earn their   livelihood   on 
account of infirmity, sickness or unemployment” [Constitution of Pakistan  (2010)].   
Whether this commitment is actually fulfilled in spirit is a separate debate but a whole 
range of safety net programmes has been initiated in the country over the years. Discussion on 
all these initiatives is beyond the scope of this paper, as it focuses on the BISP. However, a 
summary of the safety net programmes functioning in the country is presented in Table 1. For 
a useful discussion on safety net programmes operating in Pakistan see, Jamal (2010), World 
Bank (2007), Arif (2006), Irfan (2005), Bari, et al., (2005).  
The findings of the studies carried out to evaluate the functioning of the various safety 
net programmes have a general consensus that these programmes are having a positive impact 
but their effectiveness can be significantly improved. These programmes are hindered by 
issues related to coverage, targeting, and implementation [Bari, et al. (2005); World Bank 
(2007)]. These programmes aim at improving their accessibility to the poor  devising means to 
encourage  poor to move out of poverty permanently, and improving social security in the 
larger context as well. Other issues characterising these safety net programmes are:  
duplication, overlap, lack of inter-organisational coordination and fragmentation, which need 
to be tackled for a greater impact of these social initiatives.2  
 
2
For a detailed analysis on the current safety net initiatives by the Government of Pakistan see, Jamal 
(2010), World Bank (2007), Arif (2006), Irfan (2005), Bari, et al. (2005).  
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Table 1 
Current Social Safety Net Initiatives with National Coverage in Pakistan 
Programme Financed by Benefit Target group Coverage Managed by 
Benazir Income 
Support Programme 
Public funds Cash as 
income 
support 
Married females belonging 
to very poor households 
National Fed. Govt 
Microfinance Donor funds Cash as loan 
for setting up 
business 
To poor for self-
employment and move 
them out of poverty 
National RSPs and MFIs 
Pakistan Bait-ul-
Maal 
Public funds Cash support 
for daughters’ 
wedding, food 
and education 
Disabled persons, widows, 
orphans and households 
living below poverty line 
National Fed. Govt 
People’s Work 
Programme 
Public funds Cash for work Provision of electricity, 
gas, farm to market roads, 
water supply and such 
facilities to rural poor 
National Fed. Govt 
People’s Rozgar 
Scheme 
Commercial 
banks 
Financing for 
selected 
businesses 
Unemployed educated 
people 
National NBP 
Subsidy on wheat, 
sugar and fertilizer 
Public funds In kind  Poor segments National Fed. Govt 
Utility Stores Public funds Subsidy in 
prices 
Poor segments National Fed. Govt 
Zakat and Ushr Levy on bank 
deposits and 
agri. yield 
Cash Deserving/needy among 
Muslims 
National Govt., zakat 
and ushr 
committees 
Child Labour and 
children in bondage 
Public funds Protection 
and 
rehabilitation 
services 
Working children facing 
abuse and exploitation 
National Fed. and prov. 
govts, FATA 
and GB 
Employees Old-Age 
Benefit Scheme 
Employers’ 
contribution 
Cash Formal sector employees National Fed. Govt 
Social Health 
Insurance 
Individuals’ 
contribution 
Cash General population National Fed. Govt 
Workers Welfare 
Fund 
Employers’ 
contribution 
Housing, 
schools and 
health 
facilities 
Formal sector employees National Fed. Govt 
Source: Ministry of Finance 2012:226. 
Note: Abbreviations used: Fed-Federal; Govt- Government; Prov-Provincial; NBP: National Bank of Pakistan; 
Agri-Agriculture; RSPs-Rural Support Programmes; MFIs-Microfinance institutions. 
 
The BISP, as stated earlier, was initiated in 2008 by the Government of 
Pakistan with the immediate objective of mitigating the impact of rampant inflation, 
especially food and fuel inflation, faced by the poor. Over the years the BISP has 
become the main safety net programme in the country having maximum numbers of 
beneficiaries among all public initiatives. By the end of the third quarter of the 
financial year 2011-12, the BISP covered over four million recipients nationwide 
with over Rs 122 billion disbursed among them [Ministry of Finance, MoF,  (2012)]. 
The programme envisaged spreading its reach to seven million people nationwide by 
the end of the financial year 2011-12.  
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At the start of the BISP, in the absence of data for the identification of the under-
privileged, the parliamentarians were entrusted with the task of  identifying the deserving 
people in their constituencies to be provided relief. A simple application form, along with 
the eligibility criteria, was given to the parliamentarians at both provincial and national 
level to identify the underprivileged and needy in their constituencies [Khan and Qutub 
(2010)]. With time and in the face of criticism from opposition parliamentarians, 
however, a more scientific procedure was adopted. The eligible households are now 
identified through a survey and application of Proxy Means Test (PMT) formula. The 
PMT procedure estimates the welfare status of a household on a scale of 0 to 100 helping 
in identifying the poorest households [MoF (2012)]. For the application of the PMT 
formula, a nationwide Poverty Scorecard Survey was conducted in 2010 covering around 
27 million households in the country. To increase the accuracy, objectivity and 
replicability of the survey, GPS readings were also taken, which also helped in devising 
coping strategies for natural disaster. After conducting this survey the eligibility criteria 
for households to receive the monthly cash transfer from the BISP was redefined and is  
as follows: 
(1) The Proxy Means Test (PMT) score of the household is 16.17 or lower 
(2) All the married women within a household are beneficiaries whom PMT 
score is below the cut off point   
(3) Woman is holder of a computerised national identification card (CNIC) from 
NADRA.3 
The BISP is being implemented in all four provinces of the country (namely, 
Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), the Federally Administered Tribal 
Areas (FATA), Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) and the Islamabad Capital Territory 
(ICT). The eligible households, through their females, receive a monthly cash transfer of 
Rs 1000, which for a poor family with a monthly income of Rs 5000 is an increase of 20 
percent, which equals to 12 percent of the minimum wage in Pakistan. It is worth 
mentioning here that the BISP cash assistance amount is equivalent to 60 percent of the 
2010 official poverty line in Pakistan. Initially the payments to the BISP selected 
households were made through the Pakistan Post, which paid the money to the recipients 
at their doorstep. To increase the transparency of the programme, and reduce any possible 
pilferage, the BISP is adopting more technology based solutions such as: Benazir Debit 
Cards, which can be used as ATM cards by the recipients withdrawing the cash  payment 
every month; Smart Cards, authorized by a commercial bank; and Phone to Phone 
Banking, by providing free mobile phones and SIMs to beneficiaries for the transfer of 
monthly cash assistance [MoF (2012)].  
What comes as a relief regarding the design of the programme is the building in of 
various graduation initiatives helping the recipient households to exit from the poverty 
trap. Starting as a solely cash transfer programme, the BISP  has been redesigned  in 
2011-12 to launch various initiatives in order to add a sense of permanence to the benefits 
gained by the recipient households [BISP (2012)]. Each of these new programmes has 
been initially launched in a few selected districts of the country with the aim to spread 
 
3
The previous eligibility criteria used before the conduction of the Poverty Scorecard Survey in 2010,  
will be used in this study, and be discussed in the succeeding sections.  
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them nationwide.  Some of these initiatives include the:  Waseela-e-Haq micro-finance 
programme, providing soft loans up to Rs 300,000  for setting up small businesses, to 
households randomly selected by computers on monthly basis; Waseela-e-Rozgar 
programme under which one member of the selected household is provided technical and 
vocational training to sustain his livelihood; Waseela-e-Sehat programme providing life 
insurance cover of Rs 100,000 to the breadwinner of the selected households; and 
Waseela-e-Taleem in which primary education is imparted to the children of the recipient 
households [MoF (2012); BISP (2012)].  
It may be mentioned here that this paper restricts itself to the cash transfer 
programme carried out under the BISP initiative on the whole. Literature voices a strong 
concern about creating a dependency among households receiving such cash transfers 
[Kunnemann and Leonhard (2008); IBRD (2009)]. Dependency, as expressed by Samson 
(2009: 46) implies that, “the choice by a social cash transfer recipient to forego a more 
sustaining livelihood due to the receipt of the cash transfer”. Worldwide evidence, 
however, suggests otherwise. Studies conducted in a vast number of developing countries 
including Brazil, Mexico, Kenya and Zambia, analysing the impact of the BISP-like cash 
transfers have found that workers in households receiving such cash transfers look for 
employment more intently than comparable poor households not receiving any such cash 
assistance [Samson (2009); Posel (2006); Kunnemann and Leonhard (2008); Samson and 
Williams (2007); Barrientos (2006); and Kidd (2006)]. 
Another factor, which needs our attention regarding the BISP design is the 
unconditionality of the cash transfer under the Programme to the recipient households. 
Conditionalities are basically behavioural requirements expected from the recipients in 
order to remain eligible to receive the cash transfer. These conditions are considered an 
effective tool for poverty alleviation, helping to break the inter-generational transmission 
of poverty by increasing the human capital of individuals. Examples of such conditions 
can be found in a number of successful programmes being carried out in different 
countries like the Oportunidades/PROGRESSA in Mexico, Bolsa Escola and Bolsa 
Familia in Brazil, Food for Education in Bangladesh and Programme of Advancement 
through Health and Education in Jamaica [Son (2008)]. The conditions laid down under 
these programmes are usually linked to education, especially girls’ education, and health, 
generally women and child health. The idea behind these conditions is that handing over 
cash to families is not enough to deal with poverty in the long run and such conditions 
will obligate the recipient households to empower themselves by investing in human 
capital and, hence, improve their chances of decent employability and moving out of 
poverty on a permanent basis.  
Along with achieving the socially optimal targets of human capital, conditional 
cash transfers have some other advantages as well including those mentioned by Adato 
and Hoddinott  (2007):  
(i) Lessening the possible stigma associated with cash transfer by considering it 
a part of a social contract between the recipient household and the state.  
(ii) Preferred for political economy reasons, and making it politically and 
economically more acceptable in the larger context. Improvement in education 
and health indicators helps increase the credibility of a programme which 
otherwise might be seen with suspicion, especially by those not receiving it.  
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Contrary to this view there are those who believe that conditionalities compromise 
the very objective of poverty reduction, especially in the short run, by reducing the 
benefits of a cash transfer to a poor household by constraining its welfare choices. These 
imposed conditions can be, “expensive, inflexible, and inefficient- in the worst cases 
screening out the poorest and the most vulnerable. Often the burden of complying with 
conditionalities falls disproportionately on women” [Samson (2006: 51)]. Some of the 
most common concerns raised for conditionalities for a cash transfer include [as observed 
by Handa and Davis (2006); Samson (2009); and Basett (2008); Son (2006); and Regalia 
(2006)]:  
(i) The high administrative cost of handling conditional cash transfer might 
outweigh its positive impact. 
(ii) Lack of access to educational and health facilities in the poorer areas can 
make the condition redundant for the poor and hence making them ineligible 
for the cash transfer.  
(iii) The preferences of the poor people may differ from the conditions imposed 
on them, thus, reducing the welfare gains.  
(iv) Cultural and social exclusion and discrimination may leave the neediest out 
of the welfare circle.  
Those opposing conditionalities on cash transfers also consider it demeaning to the 
poor as such conditions imply that the poor do not themselves know what is good for 
them. As argued by Basett (2008), following the traditional economic theory, cash 
transfers should ideally be unconditional. Individuals, as rational beings, make decisions 
to maximise their well-being, opting for choices where the perceived benefits outweigh 
the perceived costs. Going by this logic a cash transfer would be most effective with no 
conditions attached to it as the poor, being rational economic beings, will maximise the 
benefits to them. If a cash transfer reduces the opportunity cost of sending a poor 
household’s child to school instead of work, making the perceived benefits of educating 
outweigh its cost, decision would be taken by the household to send the child to school 
even without any compulsory conditions. In a scenario where beneficiaries are informed 
and rational economic beings, the state is caring and markets are efficient, IBRD (2008: 
48-49) believes that, “The ‘theoretical default’…… should be to favour unconditional 
cash transfer”.  
As Samson (2009) observes, in some countries poverty levels are high due to 
structural factors  and not just because of  the behaviour and preferences of the poor. This 
would be true for any society, that has yet to overcome its structural inequalities, which  
may discriminate against certain people, restricting them not to avail the opportunities 
that might be available to them otherwise, keeping them stuck in the poverty trap. The 
need for a BISP-like programme, thus, becomes important in the presence of vulnerable 
population in the country, which is becoming more susceptible to poverty due to  
inflationary trends and the structural inequalities characterising the societal makeup.  
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
To evaluate the BISP, the present study uses the Pakistan Panel Household Survey 
(PPHS) carried out by the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE) in the 
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year 2010. To link the cash assistance with poverty dynamics the panel information of the 
survey is used. It is worth mentioning here that the PPHS is a panel dataset, comprising 
three waves. The Round-I of the PPHS, named Pakistan Rural Household Survey 
(PRHS), was conducted in 2001 in all four provinces of the country, covering 2721 rural 
households. The Round-II of the PRHS was carried out in the year 2004 covering 1907 
households in rural Sindh and Punjab. The survey was not carried out in two provinces, 
Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), due to the security conditions prevailing 
there at that time. The third round of the panel survey was conducted in 2010, again in all 
four provinces, adding an urban sample to the survey as well. Inclusion of the urban 
sample led to the renaming of the survey as the Pakistan Panel Household Survey 
(PPHS). The urban sample of the PPHS 2010 was selected from the 16 districts that were 
included in the PRHS-2001. The PPHS-2010, thus, covers 4142 households in all four 
provinces of the country, in both rural and urban areas. These over four thousand 
households comprise 2198 panel households in the rural areas (coming from PRHS-
2001), along with 602 split households from original households, making the total rural 
sample stand at 2800 households. The remaining 1342 households were included from 
the urban areas of the selected districts to make up the total sample4. It may be mentioned 
here that the three waves of the PPHS-PRHS panel data collection is a joint effort of  
PIDE and the World Bank.   
The PPHS-2010 covers wide ranging modules to meet the objectives of this study. 
A detailed section of the survey questionnaire deals with the targeting process of the 
various safety net programmes initiated by the government and by individuals to protect 
the marginalised segments of the society. A transfer/assistance module included in the 
PPHS-2010 provides information about the status of received transfer/assistance in three 
categories, namely: receive assistance; attempt but not succeed; and never attempt. The 
respondents are also asked about how they had utilised the received cash. There is, 
however, one limitation about the questions asked about the cash transfers. There is no 
question about the duration for which a household has been receiving any cash 
transfer/assistance. The survey asks a household if it has received any cash assistance in 
the last 12 months, without specifying the exact duration for which the transfers have 
been taking place. For a better analysis of the impact of these transfers on household 
welfare the exact duration of transfer would have been valuable.  
To analyse the socio-demographic and economic characteristics of the households 
along with the status of received assistance, the present study classifies households into 
three categories, that is the: receiving group; attempt group; and never attempt group. To 
analyse the effect of the BISP on a household’s welfare, independent of other cash 
transfers, two categories of households are formed. One consists of households that 
receive the BISP, and the other category comprises those households that receive cash 
transfers from sources other than the BISP.  
To estimate the impact of the BISP cash assistance on a household’s welfare, this 
study follows the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) method. The aim of the safety net 
programmes is to improve the welfare of the poor, especially the most vulnerable. 
However, all those in need do not necessarily receive it. Some of these households get 
 
4
See Annex 1 for the detailed household composition of the PRHS/PPHS sample in the three rounds of 
survey in 2001, 2004 and 2010.  
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assistance and some do not, referred to as ‘receiver’ and ‘non-receiver’ households, 
respectively.  
Though other methods like logistic regression analysis, paired observations and 
double difference method can also be used to analyze the welfare impact, the PSM 
method was preferred due to its various strengths over the other methods5. For instance, 
the logistic regression analysis ignores the issue of ‘selection bias’ and considers the 
socio-demographic and economic characteristics of the ‘receiver’ and ‘non-receiver’ 
households as widely different. It is usually understood that the ‘non-receiver’ group is 
comparatively at a better welfare level and, therefore, is less likely to receive assistance 
from the safety net programmes, that is, it is less likely that an upper middle income or 
rich income household in Pakistan will receive the assistance from Zakat or Bait-ul-Maal. 
Taking the mean outcome of ‘non-receiver’ households as an approximation is also not 
advisable as the ‘receiver’ and ‘non-receiver’ households usually differ in socio-
economic characteristics even in the absence of these safety net programmes or some 
time a programme purposely selects the ‘receiver’ households [Kopeinig (2008)]. The 
paired observation and double difference (DD) methods require the household 
information before and after the intervention,  in order to analyse the welfare impact of a 
programme.  Paired observation technique is usually applicable to one variable only by 
assuming no impact of other variables, making it too ideal to be applied here. The DD 
approach is a non-experimental approach in which the welfare changes over time are 
estimated relative to the outcome observed for a pre-intervention baseline. Though the 
baseline information is available in the PPHS, because it is a panel household survey and 
the 2001 and 2004 waves have the baseline information, but this information  does not 
necessarily  precede the intervention. In the present instance, the baseline information 
would not be homogenous as the assistance-receiving households must have gone 
through numerous socio-demographic and economic changes during 2004  to 2010 
period, making it impossible to capture the heterogeneity over the whole duration.  
The Propensity-Score Matching (PSM) method developed by Rosenbaum and 
Rubin (1983) is one of the possible solutions to deal with the issue of ‘selection bias’. 
The rationale behind this technique is to find a comparison group that has similar 
characteristics to  those of the ‘receiver’ group in all aspects except one, that is the 
comparison group does not get any cash assistance. This method balances the observed 
covariates between the ‘receiver’ group and the ‘non-receiver’ group based on the 
similarity of their predicted probabilities of receiving the assistance, called their 
‘propensity scores’. The difference between PSM and a pure experiment is that the latter 
also  ensures that the treatment and comparison groups are identical in terms of the 
distribution of unobserved characteristics [Ravallion (2003)]. 
As noted earlier, two groups were identified in the PPHS on the basis of status of 
cash assistance: the receivers and the non-receivers. In the PSM analysis, the former are 
the ‘treated units’ while the later are ‘non-treated units’. Treated units are matched to the 
non-treated units on the basis of the propensity score. See Appendix A for a detailed 
explanation on the PSM methodology.   
P(Xi ) = Prob (Di=  1| Xi ) =  E(D| Xi ) … … … … (1) 
 
5
Nssah (2006). Propensity Score Matching and Policy Impact Analysis a Demonstration in Eviews. 
WPS 3877. The World Bank. Washington, D.C.  
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Where Di = 1 if the household has received assistance and 0 otherwise and Xi is a vector 
of pre-treatment characteristics. Before estimating the PSM, two conditions should be 
met to estimate the Average Treatment on the Treated (ATT) effect based on the 
propensity score (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). The first condition is the balancing of 
pre-treatment variables given the propensity score. If the balancing hypothesis is 
satisfied, the pre-treatment characteristics must be the same for the target and the control 
groups. The second condition is that of the unconfoundedness given the propensity score. 
If assignment to treatment is unconfounded conditional on the variables pre-treatment, 
then assignment to treatment is unconfounded given the propensity score. Using equation 
1, first the propensity scores are calculated through logistic regression, and then the 
Average Treatment on the Treated (ATT) effect is estimated  by four different methods: 
Nearest Neighbour Matching; Kernel Matching; Stratification Matching; and Radius 
Matching; 
ATT  = E (Y1i - Y0i | Di = 1)  
= E (ATE | Di = 1) 
= E{E(Y1i - Y0i | Di = 1, p(X i))}  
= E{E(Y1i | Di =1, p(X i))} - E[E{Y0i | Di =0, p(X i))}| Di = 1} … (2) 
Where 
Y1i is the potential outcome if household is treated, and 
Y0i is the potential outcome if household is not treated 
The above discussed methodology of Propensity Score Matching (PSM) method 
has been applied to the PPHS-2010 dataset to analyse the impact of the BISP on a 
receiving household welfare. Since household welfare is a multi-dimensional 
phenomenon, therefore the impact has been estimated on five indicators which are: 
poverty; food expenditure per capita; health expenditure per capita; school enrolment of 
children of age 5-14; and employment status of women of age 15-64. 
Following the empirical exercise, firstly the propensity scores have been 
estimated on the basis of Equation 1 where the dependent variable is whether the 
household is a receiver or a non-receiver. On the right side of the equation 1, the 
three sets of explanatory variables have been used which can be the major reasons for 
getting assistance. These three sets of variables are: the individual characteristics, 
including the head of the household’s sex, education and employment status; the 
household characteristics, including female to male ratio, household size, 
dependency ratio, number of persons per room, land and livestock assets, shocks and 
presence of a disabled person in the household; and the regional characteristics 
including region and province. Since the dependent variable is dichotomous in nature 
with two outcomes: received assistance or did not receive assistance, therefore, the 
Binary Logistic Regression has been applied to estimate the determinants of 
receiving assistance whereas the ‘not-receiver’ group serves as the reference 
category. Using the ‘psmatch2, pscrore, attnd, attk, attr and atts’ commands in 
STATA, comparison has been made between the treated and non-treated units and 
the welfare impact has been calculated.  
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After calculating the propensity scores, the Average Treatment Effect on the 
Treated (ATT) has been estimated. In order to make the working sample even more 
comparable, the sample has been restricted to only those units with probabilities that lie 
within the region known as the common support, which is the area where there are 
enough of both, control and treatment observations, to proceed with the comparisons 
[Dehejia (2005)]. This also means that those units have been excluded where the treated 
and non-treated units do not have comparable values. 
 
EVALUATION OF THE BISP 
Any effective social safety net programme needs to fulfil certain criteria, including 
[Pasha, et al. (2005); World Bank (2007)]: 
(i) Targeting: the extent to which a programme reaches its intended target 
population rather than those who do not actually need it. 
(ii) Coverage: the proportion of the target population that benefits from a 
programme.  
(iii) Administrative cost: the proportion of the administrative cost against that 
used on the benefits.  
(iv) Accessibility: the ease with which an eligible household could access the 
programme socially, monetarily, logistically and administratively.  
(v) Adequacy: the sufficiency of the safety net, like a cash transfer, to have any 
positive effect.    
(vi) Positive incentive effect: safety nets that have a positive incentive not only 
help to sustain the programme but also serve to alleviate poverty in the 
larger context.  
(vii) Sound financing source: safety nets with well-defined, self-reliant sources 
are fiscally more sustainable than those relying on ad hoc, external sources.  
(viii) Independence from other transfers: a transfer taking place under a 
programme should not exclude other transfers which may have net negative 
effects on  household’s welfare.  
Before we look into the performance of the BISP using some of the above 
mentioned criteria6 let us first see how many households are receiving  cash assistance, 
and their sources, in the study sample. As reported by the respondents in the PPHS-2010, 
and shown in Table 2, 10.7 per cent of the households are receiving cash assistance from 
a variety of programmes, with no major difference in the trends between the urban and 
the rural areas. Among these programmes, the BISP is the largest programme as it covers 
about two-thirds of the total households receiving any form of cash transfer, in both the 
rural and urban areas.  
 
 
6
 Some of the stated criteria to evaluate  social safety net programmes,  such as the administrative cost 
to carry out the programmes, and sound financing sources, are macro level issues and, thus, beyond the scope of 
this study.  
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Table 2 
Number of Households Receiving Cash Transfer by Type/Source  
of Assistance and Region 
 National Urban Rural 
Total Number of Households  4142 1342 2800 
Households Receiving Cash Transfers from Government Programmes 
Benazir Income Support Programme 285 87 198 
Food Support Programme    17   5   12 
Zakat   19   2    17 
Bait-ul-Maal   10   3     7 
Food items on subsidized rates     5   3     2 
People’s Rozgar Programme     7   1     6 
Others   29   8   21 
Households Receiving Cash Transfers from Individuals 
Private Zakat 21 8 13 
Private Ushr   3 1   2 
Fitrana/Sadqaat 16 7   9 
Assistance/Gift in kind 23 8 15 
Total Number of Households Receiving Cash Transfers from Any Source 
 435 133 302 
Percentage of Households Receiving Cash Transfers from Any Source 
 10.7 10.5 10.8 
Source: Authors’ estimation from the micro-data of PPHS 2010.  
Note: Total number of households in the study sample is 4142. 
 
As can be seen from Table 2, the received cash assistance has two major 
categories, that is, cash assistance received from government sources and cash assistance 
received from the individual sources, making a total of 10.7 per cent of the total 
households receiving at least some sort of cash assistance. Table 3 shows that out of these 
10.7 per cent cash receiving households, a significant proportion of the households 
(8.8%) is getting assistance only from one source, and with the rural areas showing a 
slightly higher proportion of households receiving cash transfer  as compared to urban 
areas. There are only a few households, which are getting assistance from two or more 
than two programmes, i.e., a household may be getting assistance from the private Zakat 
and also from Bait-ul-Maal. 
  
Table 3 
Percentage of Households with the Number of Received Assistances by Region 
Number(s) of Cash Transfers National Urban Rural 
0   90.47     90.94   90.26 
1     8.79       8.04     9.13 
2     0.52       0.87     0.36 
3 and more     0.22       0.16      0.25 
All 100.00   100.00 100.00 
N (4,061) (1,269) (2,792) 
Source: Authors’ estimation from the micro-data of PPHS 2010. 
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As shown in Table 2 and 3, there are 435 households, which have received 
assistance from various programmes and some of them have also benefitted from more 
than one programme. Coming to the BISP and the number of its beneficiaries, we see 
from Figure 1 that the BISP receiving households outnumber all other public and private 
funded safety net initiatives put together. At the national level, 264 households were 
receiving cash transfer under the BISP, 67 households were getting assistance from other 
state-run safety net programmes, 29 households were assisted by private sources, and 27 
households were those which received assistance from multiple sources, making a total of 
387 net households (see Figure 1). 
 
Fig. 1.  Number of Households by Source of Assistance Received and Region 
 
Source: Authors’ estimation  from the micro-data of PPHS 2010. 
 
As can be seen from Figure 1, the BISP is the largest safety net programme 
covering more than two-thirds of the households receiving any form of assistance in the 
study sample.  As stated earlier, one of the key objectives of the BISP was to help the 
poorest of the poor households against rising inflation by providing for their basic needs 
as these people have few physical and soft assets to cope with any shock.   
As the aforementioned discussion shows, cash transfers from the various 
programmes have been split into three categories, namely assistance from: the BISP; 
other government programmes; and private sources. Likewise, the sample households 
have also been grouped into three categories: recipient households; never-attempt 
households and the attempt households. Table 4 summarises the patterns trends for cash 
transfers across the four provinces and the two regions as reported by the PPHS sampled 
households. The proportion of households receiving BISP assistance is the highest in the 
province of Sindh (13.6 percent), followed by Balochistan (8.5 percent), KP (4.9 percent) 
and Punjab (3.1 percent). Across the regions, not much difference is found between the 
proportions of households receiving the BISP assistance in the rural (7.1 percent) and the 
urban (6.9 percent) areas (Table 4). Although it is difficult to explain some uneven 
distribution of the BISP cash across the provinces found in this study and more in-depth 
data are required to construe whether it is a political phenomenon or is due to any other 
reason.  This trend can be attributed to one probable reason that is over representation of 
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the poorer regions, particularly from Sindh and Balochistan, in the PPHS sample. While 
the poorer districts of Badin, Larkana and Loralai, in the province of Sindh and 
Balochistan, are included in the sample, the more urbanised and well-off districts of 
Karachi, Hyderabad and Quetta are not represented.  
Another interesting factor to be noted in Table 4 is the proportion of households 
falling in the ‘attempt group’ category. About 16 percent of the sampled households at 
the national level tried to get assistance from the BISP but had not succeeded. Across the 
regions more than one-fifth of the households attempt unsuccessfully to get some cash 
assistance under the BISP in urban areas, while in the rural areas this percentage is less 
with 14 percent. We may infer that the urban inhabitants might have attempted more due 
to better information and accessibility available to them as compared to the rural 
community (Table 4). Contrary to the BISP distribution pattern, the percentage 
distribution in other government programmes and in private programmes is much lower 
and smoother, in both the ‘attempt group’ and the ‘received group’, showing little 
variation across the provinces and regions. (Table 4).  
 
Table 4 
Distribution of Household’s Assistance Receiving Status by Region (%) 
 
Received Attempted Never Attempted Total 
BISP 
Overall  7.0 16.2 76.8 100.0 
Rural  7.1 13.8 79.1 100.0 
Urban  6.9 21.4 71.8 100.0 
Other Government 
Overall 2.1 3.1 94.9 100.0 
Rural  2.7 2.8 94.9 100.0 
Urban  1.7 3.6 94.7 100.0 
Private 
Overall 1.2 0.0 98.8 100.0 
Rural  1.0 0.1 98.9 100.0 
Urban  1.5 0.0 98.5 100.0 
Source: Authors’ estimation  from the micro-data of PPHS-2010. 
Note: Due to rounding off some of the figures appear as zeros.  
 
BISP’s Targeting 
For any social safety net programme to be successful, the issue of targeting is of 
utmost importance.  Before the Proxy Means Test (PMT) formula was adopted to identify 
the eligible households, the BISP had a set of seven criteria that a household had to fulfil 
to be eligible to receive cash assistance under the programme. Since the PPHS-2010 was 
conducted before the introduction of the new PMT formula, we will evaluate the 
efficiency of the BISP targeting on the basis of its initial criteria. The initial criteria 
regarding the eligibility of a household to receive BISP cash transfer included:  
(i) A monthly income of less than Rs 6000. 
(ii) No family member in government service. 
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(iii) Possession of no or less than 3 acres of agricultural land or up to 3 marlas 
residential property. 
(iv) Possession of Computerized National Identity Card. 
(v) Should not be beneficiary of other support programmes. 
(vi) Should not have an account with a foreign bank. 
(vii) Should not possess a passport or an overseas Pakistani identity card. 
In this study a cross-check evaluation has been made on the basis of available 
information in PPHS dataset of two indicators, which are land holding and getting 
assistance from other government sources. The above-mentioned BISP criteria show that 
an eligible household should possess less than three acres of land. However, Table 5 
shows that about 10.5 per cent of the BISP-receiving households have land ownership 
ranging from 3 to 10 acres, and another 5.6 per cent have landownership of 10 acres and 
above, thus making a total of 16.1 per cent of the receiving households being ineligible in 
case of strict application of the stated criteria. The criteria seem to be followed most 
strictly in the province of Punjab, and to be most lax in KP (Table 5). The cross-check 
analysis also shows that 12 BISP receiving households (that is approximately 4 percent) 
are also receiving assistance from some other government sources, which violates the 
conditions set forth by the BISP design, as can be seen from Table 5.  
 
Table 5 
BISP Targeting: Compliance with the Landholding and Multi-source Assistance Criteria 
 National Punjab Sindh KP Balochistan 
Eligibility Criteria 1: Land Ownership 
No land 73.0 79.2 72.2 61.3 73.7 
Small landholding (< 3 acre) 10.9 18.9 10.8 22.6 10.5 
Medium landholding (3 to < 10 acres) 10.5 1.9 11.3 12.9 2.6 
Large landholding (> 10 acres) 5.6 0.0 5.7 3.2 13.2 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
N 285 55 161 31 38 
Eligibility Criteria 2: Not Getting Cash from other Government Sources 
Number of Households 12 4 5 2 1 
Source: Authors’ estimation  from the micro-data of PPHS 2010. 
  
Along with  comparison of the  households receiving cash assistance against the 
BISP’s prescribed criteria, another way of evaluating the programme targeting is to look 
into the socio-demographic and economic characteristics of the BISP receiving and non-
receiving households. Table 6 shows that the recipient households on average have 
bigger household sizes, poor education of the heads of the households and less working 
heads as compared to the other two categories, that is the never attempt and attempt 
groups. Regarding assets, the households receiving cash assistance are comparatively 
more deprived than the never-attempt and attempt groups as the recipient households 
have fewer assets, including house, land and livestock ownership. Two broad conclusions 
can be drawn from Table 6. First, the recipient households are at a disadvantageous 
position as compared to the never attempt and attempt group. And second, the attempt 
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group, though better than the received group, is also under-privileged, and has much 
lower socio-economic characteristics than the never attempt group. Similar results have 
been found by other studies done on the topic in Pakistan, including that done by Arif 
(2006).  
 
Table 6 
BISP Targeting: Socio-Economic Characteristics of Households by Status of Assistance 
Characteristics1 Never Attempt Received Attempt 
Household size (number)   7.5   8.0   7.8 
Education of head (average years)   3.9   2.7   3.1 
Heads employed (%) 79.0 76.5 82.1 
HH facing shock in last 5 years (%) 86.4 80.9 86.6 
Disabled person in home (%)   3.8   4.0   5.7 
Under debt households (%) 23.5 34.0 38.1 
Not owned house (%)   8.5 10.1 12.0 
Katcha house (%) 61.3 75.5 70.9 
Persons per room (number)   3.7   4.3   4.4 
Large animal (number)   1.6   1.2   1.0 
Small animal (number)   1.5    1.8 1.4 
Land owned (acres)   3.5   2.1 2.0 
Source: Authors’ estimation  from the micro-data of PPHS 2010. 
Note: 1- Numbers represent average numbers,  percentages and the proportion of each characteristic in the three 
stated categories, respectively.  
 
A deeper insight into  BISP recipient, attempt and never attempt households  will 
help us evaluate the BISP vis-à-vis its targeting. Table 7 presents the status of the 
households with different socio-demographic and economic characteristics by the status 
of received assistance. Based on the PPHS 2010 dataset, these characteristics have been 
grouped at individual and the household levels.  The individual level characteristics are 
related to the heads of households; while the household level characteristics  include 
family size, dependency ratio, presence of permanent disabled person in home, room 
availability, ownership of land and livestock, and experience of natural shocks.  
Regarding individual characteristics, sex of the head of the household is related to 
the status of received assistance from the BISP, as can be seen from Table 7. The female-
headed households have a higher rate of receiving BISP assistance as compared to the 
male-headed households. Also it is worth noting  that there is  a much higher percentage 
of those households which  are attempting to get  BISP cash transfers, reflecting an 
overall public interest in the programme (Table 7). The education of the head of the 
household has a negative association with receiving the BISP assistance as the 
households headed by more educated persons are less likely to get any assistance from 
the BISP. A similar trend prevails among the attempt group as well, with   fewer educated 
household heads attempting to get BISP cash assistance (Table 7).  
A household’s demographic, health and risk characteristics are also closely related 
to the households’ assistance receiving status (see Table 7). With rising dependency ratio 
more households are found to be receiving BISP assistance, with an even higher 
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proportion attempting to receive it. Households that have presence of a permanently 
disabled person, or those who have experienced a shock during the five years preceding 
the survey, do not show any definitive trend in receiving the BISP assistance. However,  
these results do show  large number of those households, which are attempting to receive 
the cash assistance (Table 7). It would not be wrong to infer that the high ‘Attempt’ rates 
for the BISP reflect the general accessibility of the programme and the expectations 
people have from it.  
 
Table 7 
Rates of the Status of Receiving BISP Assistance by Socio-economic 
Characteristics of Households 
Characteristics  Never Attempt Received Attempt Total 
p-value 
(chi-square) 
Sex of the Head of the Household  
Male 76.7   6.8 16.5 100.0 
0.005 
Female 71.7 13.8 14.5 100.0 
Education of the Head of the Household  
Illiterate 74.4 7.9 17.6 100.0 
0.000 
1-5 70.5 9.7 19.8 100.0 
6-10 83.1 4.0 12.9 100.0 
11+ 84.3 4.1 11.6 100.0 
Dependency Ratio by Category  
Low  78.7 6.9 14.4 100.0 
0.003 Medium  76.7 7.0 16.3 100.0 
High  72.6 7.4 20.0 100.0 
Presence of Permanent Disabled Person in Home  
No 76.9 7.2 15.9 100.0 
0.088 
Yes 70.6 6.9 22.5 100.0 
Experienced Shock over Last 5 Years  
No 74.6 9.8 15.6 100.0 
0.035 
Yes 76.9 6.7 16.4 100.0 
Persons per Room  
Up to 2 person in a room 84.7 4.6 10.7 100.0 
0.000 >2 to 3 person in a room 79.9 5.7 14.4 100.0 
>3 and above 70.7 8.8 20.5 100.0 
Debt Status  
No 80.4 6.2 13.4 100.0 
0.000 
Yes 68.4 8.8 22.7 100.0 
Land Ownership by Category  
No land 74.2 7.6 18.2 100.0 
0.000 
Up to 3 acres 78.9 6.8 14.3 100.0 
3< to 10 acres 81.7 5.7 12.6 100.0 
10< acres 84.8 4.9 10.4 100.0 
Livestock (Large Animals Only)  
No Animal 73.9 7.4 18.7 100.0 
0.000 
1/ 2 Animal 77.6 7.2 15.2 100.0 
3/ 5 Animal 84.4 6.1 9.5 100.0 
6 and above Animal 93.5 3.3 3.3 100.0 
Farm Households (Rural Area Only)  
Own land 81.2 6.0 12.8 100.0 
0.000 
Sharecropper 58.4 12.0 29.7 100.0 
Source: Authors’ estimation  from the micro-data of PPHS 2010. 
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Land and livestock ownership also shows an expected trend in receiving and 
attempting to receive BISP (Table 7), with households having fewer animals and smaller 
landholdings more likely to   benefit from the programme. Similarly, ‘persons per room’ 
also has a positive association with both the received and the attempt groups. In the rural 
areas, the sharecropping households have a much higher proportion of receiving and 
attempting to receive rates for the BISP cash assistance than those who own land, as can 
be seen from Table 7. Summing up the patterns found in Table 7, we see a clear 
relationship between the household’s socio-economic characteristics and its status of 
received BISP assistance. Also worth noting is the similarity in the patterns between the 
received group and the attempt group. This supports the finding presented in Table 3 
which also showed that the attempt group comprises vulnerable population as well, 
though in a slightly better position than the ‘received group’. These findings hint towards 
a generally effective design formulation and targeting by the BISP initiative, which 
probably needs an even bigger coverage to include those eligible households that are in 
the “attempt” group found in this study.  
 
BISP’s Role in Household Budget 
The BISP, as mentioned earlier, is the largest social safety net programme in 
Pakistan at present, covering more than two-thirds of the households, initiated to 
protect the poorest of the poor households from the rising inflation. The question of 
adequacy of the transferred amount to the recipient household is an important factor 
in evaluating the effectiveness of the BISP initiative. Needless to say, a cash 
assistance of Rs 1000 per household per month is not such a big amount that can 
change the life of the recipient but it is a reasonable enough amount to help a poor 
household to cover some of its vital needs.  It would, therefore, be interesting to 
know  where did the people spend the BISP cash transfers. The PPHS-2010 asks the 
households to report the top three priorities on which they spent the received cash 
transfers, the results of which are shown in Figure 2.  
The figure below (Figure 2) shows that as their first priority, about 95 per cent of 
the households reported that they had spent the BISP amount to meet daily household 
expenses, followed by 3.5 percent of the households which spent this amount on 
education, 1.4 percent on medical  and 0.35 percent on dowry.  As their second priority, 
more than half of the households have spent the cash assistance on medical, followed by 
education with 30 percent and daily household expenditures with 17 percent.  33 percent 
of the households reported that their third priority was  to spend the BISP money  to meet 
the miscellaneous  needs, followed by 30 percent on medical and 27 percent on daily 
household expenses. The first two priorities, as reported by the households, suggest that 
daily household expenditures and medical expenses are the main concerns of the poor 
households on which they have spent the BISP’s assistance money. With the exception of 
some cash utilisation on education, it would not be wrong to infer that the BISP cash 
transfer is not primarily used to build assets for the households, be they soft assets like 
education and skill development, or the physical assets like purchase of livestock or 
agriculture inputs.  
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Fig. 2.  Spending of BISP Cash by Priority and Purpose by  
Recipient Households (%) 
 
Source: Authors’ estimation from the micro-data of PPHS 2010. 
 
BISP and Dynamics of Poverty  
The PPHS-2010 dataset has detailed consumption modules covering all aspects of 
consumption including food and non-food items and also sufficient information to 
calculate the head count poverty. It is, therefore, possible to evaluate the relation between 
the BISP and other forms of assistances with households’ consumption expenditures and 
poverty. For a detailed analysis, the per capita total expenditure is split into food and non-
food expenditures. As can be seen in Table 8, the results are quite interesting. Both 
average per capita  food  and non-food expenditures are higher among the ‘never attempt’  
 
Table 8 
Average per Capita Monthly Expenditures and Expenditures by Quintiles by 
Status of Received BISP Assistance 
 
Never Attempt Received Attempt 
Per Capita Monthly Expenditure on (in Rs) 
Food  1752.3 1602.8 1534.1 
Non-food   1312.2   991.8   931.4 
Total  3105.2 2615.7 2478.5 
Per Capita Monthly Expenditure by Quintiles (%) 
First  69.3 7.9 22.8 
Second  74.7 7.6 17.8 
Third  76.3 6.3 17.5 
Fourth  77.4 8.4 14.2 
Fifth  84.1 5.2 10.7 
p-value (chi-square)= 0.000 
Poverty Level
1
 (%) 
 
18.2 25.2 27.2 
Source: Authors’ estimation  from the micro-data of PPHS 2010. 
Note: Measured through headcount method at Rs 1,671.89 per adult per month.  
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group as compared to the ‘received’ and ‘attempt’ group.  The ‘never attempt’ group is, 
thus, comparatively better off and in no need to get assistance. However, the ‘received’ 
group has on average more per capita food and non-food expenditures as compared to the 
attempt group, which is trying to get the BISP assistance (Table 8). It may be inferred from 
these findings that the higher expenditures in the ‘received’ group as compared to the 
‘attempt’ group is  the result of the safety net intervention made to enhance the welfare 
level of the vulnerable population. Since the poor households spend a major proportion of 
their expenditures on essential items like food, as can be seen in Figure 2, the expenditure 
of the ‘received’ group on these commodities is higher than the ‘attempt’ group.  
The quintiles’ analysis in Table 8 suggests that as we move up the quintile ladder, 
fewer households are found receiving, or attempting to receive, any form of cash 
assistance or to have attempted to get one. It is, however, worth noting here a substantial 
proportion of the richer households receiving the BISP cash assistance is raising doubts 
about the efficiency in its targeting. Some of these initial issues in targeting are said to be 
dealt within the new criteria for selection of beneficiaries by the BISP (as given in the 
discussion above) and it would be interesting to see the effect  it had on ground from a 
dataset post these amendments.  
A somewhat similar picture emerges when we look at the figures for absolute 
poverty and receiving of the BISP cash in Table 8. As expected, poverty is at a lower 
level among the households, which have never attempted to receive the BISP cash 
assistance. However, if we look at the poverty levels of those who receive and those who 
attempt to get the BISP cash, we see a trend that begs explanation. Poverty levels among 
the BISP recipients are slightly lower than those non-BISP recipients who attempt to 
obtain it (see Table 8). Is the BISP cash assistance helping its recipients to move out of 
poverty in some cases? The answer can arguably be yes as if for nothing else it has 
helped improve the recipient households’ food expenditure (see Figure 2), which 
eventually matters for the headcount measure of poverty.  
As noted earlier, three waves of the PPHS dataset (2001, 2004 and 2010) are 
available, however, only for rural Punjab and Sindh. On the basis of these panel 
households, five categories of poverty dynamics are made to observe the association 
between the households’ poverty movements and its status of received BISP cash 
transfers. The five categories are:  poor in all three periods (chronic poor); moving out; 
falling in; and moving in and out of poverty. Table 9 presents the association between 
poverty dynamics and the status of received BISP assistance, as found in the 
PRHS/PPHS. As can be seen from Table 9, the never attempt group shows two features. 
First, two-thirds of the chronic poor and moving out households have never attempted to  
get BISP assistance and second, a substantial proportion of never poor are also receiving 
BISP cash transfers or attempting to receive it (Table 9). It is, however, significant to 
note that generally a bigger proportion of households is either receiving the BISP cash 
assistance or attempting to do so who have faced poverty at least once. Looking at the 
trends for poverty dynamics and the BISP in Table 9, the lower percentage of chronic 
poor households receiving BISP might be due to poor targeting or the structural exclusion 
of chronic poor households due to their socio-economic status.  The behaviour of the 
‘attempt’ group experiencing poverty especially chronic poverty, which tries hard  to get 
assistance, hints towards both a need to expand the programme and an improved targeting 
strategy. 
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Table 9 
Status of Current Received Cash Assistance and Poverty Dynamics:  
2001, 2004 and 2010 (Rural Punjab and Sindh only)1 
 
Never Attempt Received Attempt Total 
Poor in Three Periods 66.7 6.7 26.7 100 
Moving Out 67.4 11.5 21.2 100 
Falling In 69.3 10.6 20.1 100 
Moving Out and Falling In 72.3 8.7 19.0 100 
Non Poor in Three Periods 83.0 7.6 9.5 100 
Source: Authors’ estimation from the micro-data of PRHS 2001, PRHS 2004 and PPHS 2010. 
Note: 1- Only rural Punjab and Sindh are included in this part of the analysis as they are the only regions where 
all three rounds of the panel survey have been conducted.  
 
Impact of the BISP: The Propensity Score Matching Analysis  
As noted earlier in the methodology section, the PSM method is applied on the 
PPHS-2010 dataset to analyse the impact of the BISP on household welfare. The welfare 
impact of the BISP is estimated on five household indicators which are: household 
poverty level; per capita food expenditure; per capita health expenditure; school 
enrolment of children of age 5-14; and employment status of women of age 15-647. As 
briefed in the methodology section, one has to estimate the propensity scores through 
logistic regression to calculate the Average Treatment on the Treated (ATT). There are 
two conditions that need to be met to estimate the ATT, which are of balancing property 
and of unconfoundedness property.  
Table 10 presents the results for the determinants of the BISP programme by 
incorporating the correlates,  which satisfy both of the above-mentioned conditions.  The 
dependent variable is binary in nature, that is whether the household has received 
assistance or not. The small p-value from the LR test shows that at least one of the 
regression coefficients is not equal to zero. Although the Pseudo R2 in logistic regression 
does not equate to R2 of the OLS, the model shows a significant Pseudo R2. As can be 
seen from Table 10, three sets of independent variables have been added to the model,  
related to household head; household; and the region. The results of the logistic 
regression show that the education of the head of the household has a significant negative 
association with receiving BISP cash transfer. Among the second set of characteristics, 
we see that higher the female-to-male ratio, and household size, the higher are the 
chances to get assistance from the BISP (Table 10).   
 
7
 These five indicators were formed using the PPHS-2010 dataset. The headcount poverty was 
calculated by applying the official poverty line at Rs 1,671.89 per adult per month. Monthly per capita food and 
health expenditures were calculated from the consumption and health modules of the Survey, respectively. The 
education module in the PPHS has detailed information about the enrolment status of everyone in the 
household, from it the enrolment status of children aged 5-14 has been calculated. Regarding the last indicator 
of the socio-economic welfare, the working status of the sampled women has been taken from the PPHS 
question, “Did you work during the last week at least for one hour for any wage or profitable home activities?”  
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Table 10 
Determinants of the BISP Cash Transfer: Logistic Regression 
Covariates Coefficients Standard Error 
Education of head (years) –0.045* 0.017 
Female to male ratio 0.213* 0.072 
Household size (in numbers) 0.044** 0.020 
Unexpected shock in last five years (yes=1) 0.513* 0.181 
Presence of disabled person (yes=1) –0.038 0.331 
Number of room per person –0.046 0.036 
Land ownership (in acres) –0.036** 0.015 
Total large animals  –0.034 0.034 
Total small animals  0.018 0.019 
Region (urban=1) –0.004 0.179 
Sindh/Punjab  1.421* 0.182 
KP/Punjab 0.535** 0.260 
Balochistan/Punjab 0.940* 0.257 
Constant  –3.160* 0.286 
LR chi2 120.75 (14) 
Log likelihood –792.70636 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.0708 
N 3,379 
Source: Authors’ estimation from the micro-data of PRHS 2001, PRHS 2004 and PPHS 2010. 
 
As can be seen from Table 10, the households that faced an unexpected shock over 
the five years preceding the survey are more likely to get BISP assistance as compared to 
those who did not face any such shock.  Presence of a permanently disabled person in 
home and the characteristics related to loan obtained, rooms per person and assets 
ownership, including that of livestock, however, show no impact on getting cash 
assistance from the BISP while the land ownership has a significant negative impact on 
getting cash assistance (Table 10). Regarding the third set of the independent variables, 
the coefficient of region is not significant. On the contrary, however, a significant 
variation in the BISP cash transfer prevails across the provinces, with households in 
Sindh, KP and Balochistan more likely to receive BISP assistance as compared to the 
province of Punjab.  
This brings us to the final stage of the PSM analysis, results for which are 
presented in Table 11. The Table shows the estimated welfare impact of the BISP by 
displaying the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) against the five key 
indicators related to the household welfare. The bootstrapped standard error, as well as 
the number of matching cases treated and the size of the control group, are also given 
in Table 11. The results show that the impact of the BISP on headcount poverty, though 
statistically not significant, is negative for all the three measures of PSM. Despite 
having a reasonable targeting efficiency (as seen in the above discussion as well), the 
lack of statistically significant impact on poverty is not surprising as the rationale of 
the BISP initiative suggests that it has not been designed to reduce poverty per se, and 
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has its main objective to protect the poorest of the poor against the inflationary shocks. 
Second, the criterion of the BISP suggests that the recipient households should be 
among the marginalised segments of the society and far below the poverty line. 
Although these households are getting a monthly stipend of Rs. 1000, the amount is, 
however, too low to pull the households out of poverty. The fact that these poor 
households on average have: bigger household sizes; higher dependency ratios; tilted 
female-to-male ratios; and poor possession of liquid, soft and physical assets which 
make it difficult for these households to move out of poverty through a small cash 
transfer, as  provided by BISP.  
The impact of the BISP cash transfer on per capita food and health expenditure is 
statistically significant, as can be seen from Table 11. Under the various measures of 
PSM,  the  BISP-covered  households  are  likely  to  spend  more  on  food  and health as  
 
Table 11 
Average Treatment Effects of BISP Under Various Measures of PSM and 
Socio-economic Indicators of Household 
Method 
Poverty 
(Yes=1) 
Food Expenditure 
per Capita 
(Monthly) 
Health Expenditure 
per Capita 
(Monthly) 
School 
Enrolment 
of Children 
of Age 5-14 
(Yes=1) 
Employment Status of 
Women of Age 15-64 
(Yes=1) 
Nearest Neighbour Method 
ATT –0.015        48.36 88.16       0.03 0.013        
N. Treated 235 235 235               517        568                 
N. Control 236 236 236 417 489 
St. Error 
Bootstrap 
0.042       24.25 41.11        0.05 0.038        
t-stat –0.359 1.99 2.14 0.52 0.34 
Kernel Method 
ATT 0.014        20.57     55.70 0.006 0.075 
N. Treated 235 235 235 517 568                
N. Control 2992 2992 2992 6430 6339 
St. Error 
Bootstrap 
0.028        12.38 20.54 0.019        0.080        
t-stat 0.505 1.66 2.71 0.32 0.94 
Radius Method 
ATT 0.014        29.11 
19.31 
 
0.05 0.03 
N. Treated 191                191 191                273 387 
N. Control 730 730 730 684 753 
St. Error 
Bootstrap 
0.046        14.98 12.16 0.07       0.05 
t-stat 0.296 1.94 1.59 0.714 0.60 
Stratification Method 
ATT –0.012        22.92       62.36       0.048        0.075        
N. Treated 235              235             235              517                568                
N. Control 2992 2992   2992 6324 6376 
St. Error 
Bootstrap 
0.028       10.87        32.79 0.033        0.19        
t-stat –0.422 2.11 1.90 1.45 0.39 
Source: Authors’ estimation  from the micro-data of PPHS 2010. 
 Effectiveness of Cash Transfer Programmes for Household Welfare  167 
 
 
compared to those households which have not received the assistance but  have similar 
socio-economic and demographic characteristics. The calculated welfare impact of the 
BISP transfer on food is Rs 20.6 by the Kernel method, Rs 22.9 by the Stratification 
method, 29.1 by Radius method and Rs 48.4 by the Nearest Neighbour method (Table 
11). The welfare impact on health expenditure shows that the households, which have 
received assistance from the BISP are likely to spend Rs 62.4 more on health  under the 
Stratification measure;  Rs 88.2 under the Nearest Neighbour method and Rs 55.7 under 
the Kernal method  as compared to those households  which have not received assistance 
from the BISP (Table 11). These results support the finding presented in Figure 2, which 
shows that majority of the BISP-receiving households spend the cash transfer to meet 
daily household and medical expenses. These findings conform to the studies done in 
other parts of the world where such cash transfers have been found to improve the 
nutritional and health status of the recipients [Duflo (2003); Aguero, et al. (2007); Paxson 
and Shady (2007); Cunha (2010)].  
The welfare impact of the BISP cash transfer on school enrolment of children and 
women’s participation in the labour market is positive, though not statistically significant 
(Table 11). The households receiving BISP cash assistance are at the threshold level of 
their survival and are, thus, spending the received amount to fulfil their basic necessities, 
mainly food, and not investing it to better their physical or human capital. Other 
supplementary programmes of the BISP related to skill development, employment and 
education may have a positive impact on indicators other than food,  whose analysis   as 
mentioned earlier, is beyond the scope of this study.  
 
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The BISP might not be the ‘magic bullet’ to alleviate poverty but findings of this 
study show that it has been able to provide some relief to the recipient households as far 
as food and health expenditures are concerned. In the Programme’s defence it could, 
however, be said that the rationale behind the initiative was to provide assistance to the 
poorest of the poor households in the face of rising food and fuel prices and not 
alleviating poverty per se. In the four years since its inception, the Programme has shown 
the ability to evolve with time, adjusting to the changing needs and criticism. Changes in 
the recipient households’ selection procedure and criteria by shifting from the 
parliamentarians’ recommendation to PMT scores, adoption of technology in the delivery 
of cash through Smart Cards and phone to phone banking instead of manual transfer 
through post offices are two examples in this regard.  
For any social protection programme to be effective it should have the ability to 
reach the poor and promote a permanent exit from poverty. The present study shows that 
although not all poor households were being covered by the Programme, like those which 
unsuccessfully attempted to get the BISP assistance, but the ones getting it were mostly 
poor (with a few exceptions where adherence to the set criteria was found wanting and 
consequently leakages to richer households were indicated).  The ability of the 
programme to reach the poor, however, is not matched by its capacity to encourage a 
household’s exit from poverty. The original BISP design, with its unconditional cash 
transfer, does not demand from the household to make an effort to invest in human or 
physical capital, which may help in its transition out of poverty. With the incorporation of 
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other schemes under the BISP banner later, including the Waseela-e-Haq, Waseela-e-
Taleem, Waseela-e-Sehat and Waseela-e-Rozgar, this shortcoming in the Programme 
design may well have been addressed, analysis of  these schemes is beyond the scope of 
this paper.  
Political support at high levels is a prerequisite  for the success of any such 
programme.  As discussed earlier, reasons linked to the political economy may or may 
not encourage a government to invest in such social protection schemes. Allocation  of 
Rs 122 billion for the BISP cash transfer is a huge promise which the future governments 
from the other side of the political divide may not be willing to make. The political nature 
of the name of the Programme, linking it to a particular political party,8 might not be 
considered desirable to those belonging to other political parties. The slightly lower rates 
for the BISP beneficiaries in the opposition-ruled province of Punjab hint towards such 
issues that the Programme may face in case of a political change at the Federal level.  
Despite getting a nod from the World Bank on its performance and being even 
labelled as, “An island of transparency” [Tahir (2012)], the BISP needs to take certain 
factors into account for the future. Foremost among these is the one related to fostering 
inter-agency/programme coordination. As we saw in Table 1, a number of safety net 
programmes exist in the country catering to different segments of the population. As 
noted by Heltberg and del Ninno (2006: 8), these programmes are, however, ‘fragmented, 
duplicative and sometimes ceremonial’ and are not able to fulfil the needs of the 
recipients. There is thus a need to streamline all the existing programmes and develop 
synergies between them for a more effective impact. The BISP with its extensive data 
gathered for the PMT scores can share the information with other programmes for a more 
efficient delivery. This would also help counter multiple payments to the same 
beneficiary under different programmes. A centralised system can also be considered to 
avoid duplication and ensure more stringent application of the eligibility criteria.  
Proper monitoring and supervision need to be guaranteed to maintain credibility of 
the Programme. A well-defined assessment procedure should also be in place to judge the 
adequacy of the BISP cash transfer. Is the assistance amount sufficient enough to make a 
reasonable impact on the recipient household’s budget? A cash transfer of Rs. 1000 per 
month per household may be enough in the year 2008 but would it suffice in years to 
come needs to be assessed periodically. Another factor ignored by the BISP design at 
present is the transitory nature of poverty. A household above the poverty line may move 
below it and vice versa in the face of changing circumstances. The BISP cash transfer 
should, therefore, take into account not just the poverty status of a household but its 
dynamics vis-à-vis poverty as well. A recipient household might become ineligible due to 
poverty dynamics while an ineligible household may become eligible. Such changes need 
to be taken into account by the BISP design for a more rational and equitable distribution 
of cash assistance. Last but not the least, the BISP needs to formally incorporate a 
mechanism for graduation out of poverty. Making a household exit from the poverty trap 
should be the aim of the Programme instead of continuously handing over cash 
assistance. Making households economically stable and sustainable should be any social 
protection programme’s aim and the BISP should be no exception.  
 
8
The Benazir Income Support Programme is named after Benazir Bhutto, the twice prime minister of Pakistan 
and the chairperson of the Pakistan People’s Party up until  the day she was assassinated in December, 2007.  
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ANNEXURE 
Table A-1 shows sample size of all the three rounds of panel survey and it also 
includes the split households covered in both 2004 and 2010 rounds, building on the 
basic sample selected in the 2001 round. The PPHS 2010 covered 2198 panel households 
from all the four provinces. With an addition of 602 split households, the rural sample 
comprises 2800 households and the urban sample comprises 1342 households, making a 
total sample size of 4142 households.  
 
Table-A1 
Households Covered during the Three Waves of the Panel Survey 
 
PRHS 
2001 
PRHS 2004 PPHS 2010 
Panel 
House-
holds 
Split 
House-
holds 
Total Panel 
House-
holds 
Split 
House-
holds 
Total 
Rural 
house-
holds 
Urban 
House-
holds 
Total 
Sample 
Pakistan 2721 1614 293 1907 2198 602 2800 1342 4142 
Punjab 1071 933 146 1079 893 328 1221 657 1878 
Sindh 808 681 147 828 663 189 852 359 1211 
KP 447 – – – 377 58 435 166 601 
Balochistan 395 – – – 265 27 292 160 452 
 
APPENDIX A  
METHODOLOGY OF PROPENSITY SCORE MATCHING (PSM) 
As noted earlier, two groups were identified in the PPHS on the basis of status of 
cash assistance: the receivers and the non-receivers. In the PSM analysis, the former are 
the ‘treated units’ while the later are ‘non-treated units’. Treated units are matched to the 
non-treated units on the basis of the propensity score:  
P(Xi) = Prob (Di=  1| Xi) =  E(D| Xi) … … … … … (1) 
Where  
P (Xi) = F(h (Xi)) 
F(h (Xi)) can be the normal or the logistic cumulative distribution 
Di = 1 if the household has received assistance and 0 otherwise 
Xi is a vector of pre-treatment characteristics 
Before estimating the PSM, two conditions should be met to estimate the Average 
Treatment on the Treated (ATT) effect based on the propensity score [Rosenbaum and 
Rubin (1983)]. The first condition is the balancing of pre-treatment variables given the 
propensity score. If p(X) is the propensity score, then: 
Di= Xi | p(Xi) … … … … … … … (2) 
If the balancing hypothesis is satisfied, the pre-treatment characteristics must be 
the same for the target and the control groups. In other words, for a given propensity 
score, exposure to treatment is a randomised experiment and, therefore, treated and non-
treated units should be on average observationally identical. The second condition is that 
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of the unconfoundedness given the propensity score. Suppose that assignment to 
treatment is unconfounded, i.e.: 
Y1, Y0  = Di | Xi   
= Di | p(X i) … … … … … … (3) 
If assignment to treatment is unconfounded conditional on the variables 
pretreatment, then assignment to treatment is unconfounded given the propensity score. 
Using Equation 1, first the propensity scores are calculated through logistic regression, 
and then the Average Treatment on the Treated (ATT) effect is estimated as: 
ATT    = E (Y1i - Y0i | Di = 1)  
= E (ATE | Di = 1) 
= E{E(Y1i  – Y0i | Di = 1, p(X i))}  
= E{E(Y1i | Di =1, p(X i))} - E[E{Y0i | Di =0, p(X i))}| Di = 1} … (4) 
Where 
Y1i is the potential outcome if household is treated and 
Y0i is the potential outcome if household is not treated 
In the sense that ATT parameters focus directly on actual treatment participants, 
they determine the realised gross gain from the welfare programme and can be compared 
with its costs, helping to decide whether the programme is successful or not [Heckman, et 
al. (1999)]. However, calculating the effect through ATT is not immediately obvious 
since the propensity score is a continuous variable. To overcome this problem, four 
different methods have been proposed in the literature: Nearest Neighbour Matching; 
Kernel Matching; Stratification Matching; and Radius Matching, [Becker and Ichino 
(2002)]. This study uses the first three methods. 
Following Becker and Ichino (2002), the most straightforward matching 
method is the nearest neighbour (NN) method where initially each treated unit is 
matched with the controlled unit that has the closest propensity score. The method is 
usually applied with replacements in the control units. In the second step, the 
difference in each pair of the matched unit is computed, and finally the ATT is 
obtained as the average of all these differences. Let T be the set of treated units and C 
the set of control units, and YTi and Y
c
j  the observed outcome of the treated and 
control units, respectively. If C(i) is a set of treated units matched to the control 
treated unit i with an estimated PSM value pi then: 
C(i) =min j || pi − pj || … … … … … … (5) 
The NN method may face the risk of bad matches if the closest neighbour is far 
away. Such risk can be avoided by imposing a tolerance level on the maximum 
propensity score distance (radius). Hence, radius matching (RM) method is one form of 
imposing a common support condition where bad matches can be avoided and the 
matching quality rises. However, if fewer matches can be performed, the variance of the 
estimates increases [Caliendo and Kopeining (2008); Smith and Todd (2005)]. Radius 
matching can be shown as: 
C(i) ={pj |   || pi − pj | < r  } … … … … … … (6) 
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where the entire control units with estimated scores fall within a radius r from treated 
matched pi. In both NN and RM measure, the weights wij
 
are defined as: 
1
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The weights wj here are defined by wj = Σiwij. Similarly, variances can be 
estimated by assuming that weights are fixed and the outcome is assumed to be 
independent across units.   
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In the third method, that is the Kernel method, all the treated units are matched 
with a weighted average of all non-treated units using the weights which are inversely 
proportional to the distance between the propensity scores of treated and non-treated 
units. The ATT here can be calculated as:  
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Where G (·) is a kernel function and hn is a bandwidth parameter. The fourth method, the 
Stratification Matching method, consists of dividing the range of variation of the 
propensity score in a set of intervals (strata) such that, within each interval, the treated 
and non-treated units have the same propensity score on average. The method is also 
known as interval matching, blocking and sub-classification method [Rosenbaum and 
Rubin (1983)]. Hence, the q index defines the blocks over intervals of the propensity 
score, within each block the programme computed as: 
C
q
C
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  … … … … … (10) 
Where I(q) is the set of units in block q while NTq and NC q are the numbers of treated 
and control units in block q. The ATT in the Stratification Matching method is, thus, as 
follows:  
ii
i
qIiS
q
Q
q
S
D
D
ATT







)(
1
  
Where the weight for each block is given by the corresponding fraction of treated units 
and Q is the number of blocks. 
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